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A withdrawal of countries from the EU or the creation of a new suprana-
tional Union are neither realistic nor desirable alternatives in case the EU 
governments fail to solve the constitutional question. In order to retain 
Europe’s ability to reform itself and as a trade-off for their readiness to 
find a compromise in the upcoming intergovernmental conference, the 
“Friends of the Constitution” should demand a radical revision of the cur-
rent treaty amendment procedure.
After the failure of the original Constitu-
tional Treaty, the heads of state and gov-
ernment will at the EU summit on 21-22 
June 2007 initiate a new attempt to reform 
the current EU Treaties. More than two 
years after the French “non” and the 
Dutch “nee” a new intergovernmental con-
ference will be commissioned to negotiate 
and adopt a reform of the Union’s primary 
law. The success of these negotiations, 
which are to begin in the second half of 
2007 under the Portuguese Presidency, is 
by no means certain. The Polish President 
Lech Kaczynski has already threatened 
with a blockade if the decision-making 
procedure of “double majority”, which Po-
land considers to be disadvantageous, is 
not dropped. The Czech President Vaclav 
Klaus, one of the most vocal critics of the 
European Constitutional Treaty, has even 
called into question the whole timetable 
for a reform of the EU’s primary law until 
2009. And the governments of the   
Czech Republic, the Netherlands, and the 
United Kingdom have already defined nar-
row negotiating margins for a successful 
conclusion of the intergovernmental con-
ference – red lines which in parts deviate 
considerably from the original Constitu-
tional Treaty. On the other hand,   
the “Friends of the Constitution” who, be-
sides the 18 member states which have 
ratified the Constitutional Treaty, include 































































expressed their determination to defend 
most of the innovations laid down in the 
original text. 
 
But even if the intergovernmental confer-
ence ends in a compromise, the new text 
may well suffer the same fate as the Con-
stitutional Treaty. If the reforms fail to 
surmount the hurdle of ratification in a 
single member state, the new EU primary 
law cannot enter into force. The reform of 
the EU’s politico-institutional system 
would have failed once again. 
 
As in the past, when progress seemed 
threatened by a minority of member 
states, there is also at present a call for al-
ternative options – for a “Plan B to Plan 
B.” Such ideas start out from the belief 
that the development of the EU should not 
be held up by forces unwilling or incapa-
ble of implementing reform. In the run-up 
to the adoption of the “Berlin Declaration” 
on the occasion of the 50
th anniversary of 
the signing of the Treaties of Rome, lead-
ing members of the European Parliament 
called on the opponents of a new treaty to 
withdraw from the European Union if they 
are not prepared to place the EU on a new 
footing. Others, such as Romano Prodi, the 
Italian Prime Minister and former Presi-
dent of the Commission, have suggested 
that a Europe of different speeds could 
show the way out of the constitutional cri-
sis. This harks back to the old idea of a 
core Europe, which brings together those 
states, which seem to be willing to further 
deepen integration. Yet how realistic or 
illusionary are these alternatives? Are 
they merely being used as threatening 
gestures in order to prepare the grounds 
for the forthcoming intergovernmental 
conference? And how desirable or risky 
are such alternatives with regard to the 











The withdrawal option originates from the 
idea that the countries, which are either 
not prepared or not able to support the de-
velopment of the EU Treaties, should actu-
ally leave the European Union. After   
the “obstructionists” have left, the consti-
tutional stalemate could be overcome, and 
the new primary law could enter into force 
as soon as the remaining EU countries 
have ratified the new treaty or constitu-
tion. Thereafter the EU would no longer 
have 27 member states, but 26, 25 or even 
less. 
 
The European Treaties currently in force 
do not explicitly provide for a withdrawal 
from the Union. However, it is a distinct 
possibility, at least from a legal point of 
view. On the one hand and according to 
international law the EC/EU Treaties are 
international treaties. For this reason a 
withdrawal from the European Union could 
be administered on the basis of the gen-
eral rules of international law and in par-
ticular the “Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties“ (Article 62). 
 
On the other hand, the European Constitu-
tional Treaty, which was negotiated and 
signed by all EU member states in 2004, 
for the first time explicitly stipulates the 
possibility of a voluntary withdrawal   
(Art. I-60 TEC). Thus every member state 
can withdraw from the Union “in accor-
dance with its own constitutional require-
ments.” After the country in question has 
notified its intention to withdraw to the 
European Council, the two sides – the 
withdrawing state and the EU – will nego-
tiate and conclude an agreement setting 
out the arrangements of its withdrawal. On 
the part of the Union the Council, acting 
by a qualified majority (not unanimously!), 
will be the institution responsible for con-
cluding such an agreement. European pri-































































in question from the date of entry into 
force of the withdrawal agreement or, fail-
ing that, two years after the notification to 
the European Council, unless the latter, in 
agreement with the state concerned, 
unanimously decides to extend the period.  
 
As the Constitutional Treaty did not enter 
into force, the withdrawal clause has not 
attained legal validity. However, the 
clause is politically important as the gov-
ernments of all member states had 
adopted and signed the Constitutional 
Treaty including the possibility of a volun-
tary withdrawal. 
 
Beyond the question of a legal basis for a 
withdrawal from the EU, several facts and 
arguments speak against the practicability 
or desirability of this option: 
 
•  EU withdrawal possible only on a volun-
tary basis: No member state can be forced 
to give up its EU membership. No matter 
what the legal basis may be (Vienna Con-
vention or withdrawal clause), a with-
drawal from the EU can only be negotiated 
and executed on a voluntary basis. How-
ever, in the context of the current consti-
tutional debate it is unlikely that, in view 
of the associated political and economic 
costs, one of the countries concerned 
would actually withdraw from the EU vol-
untarily. Demanding from a state to with-
draw is thus pointless if the countries con-
cerned do not themselves deem with-
drawal from the EU to be a sensible thing 
to do. 
 
•  Weakening the EU: The voluntary with-
drawal of certain states could ease the 
ratification of a new primary law, but at 
the same time it could also substantially 
weaken the European Union. For example, 
the withdrawal of the United Kingdom 
would be a severe setback for the efforts 
being made in the area of European Secu-
rity and Defence Policy (ESDP), and thus 
for the future relevance of the EU in a 
multi-polar world setting. With regard to 
Economic and Monetary Union, the with-
drawal of the founding states and Euro-
zone countries France and the Nether-
lands, who were (also) responsible for the 
non-ratification of the original Constitu-
tional Treaty, would place a considerable 
and incalculable strain on the stability of 
the common European currency. The above 
examples show that the withdrawal of 
countries, who are (co-)responsible for a 
failure to reform the EU Treaties, would 
exact a high price from the European Un-
ion and the remaining member states. 
 
•  The danger of European division: The 
withdrawal of a group of states, which are 
either unwilling or unable to ratify the 
new primary law, entails the risk of creat-
ing rival camps in the heart of Europe. 
This would particularly be the case if for-
mer EU members decide to establish their 
own grouping in order to compensate the 
political and economic costs associated 
with the withdrawal from the EU within a 
new collective framework. This prospect 
could only be avoided, if the withdrawing 
states remain closely affiliated to the Un-
ion after their withdrawal – e.g., by enter-
ing the European Economic Area (EEA), 
which would enable them to benefit from a 
proven inter-institutional structure (EEA 
Council, Joint Committee, Joint Parliamen-
tary Committee and Consultative Commit-
tee) between the EU and EFTA and from 
the advantages of the internal market. 
“The voluntary  
withdrawal of certain  
states could substantially 
weaken the EU.” 
Since certain “obstructionists” cannot be 
forced to withdraw from the EU under the 
provisions of the current Treaties, and 
since the withdrawal of certain states 
could weaken the Union or even divide 
Europe, the withdrawal option seems nei-
ther realistic nor desirable in the context 
of the current constitutional debate. But 
would the establishment of a new Union 


































































Creation of a new  
(supranational) Union 
According to this option the states willing 
and able to deepen integration establish a 
new Union after a reform of the EU Trea-
ties failed due to the opposition of a lim-
ited number of EU countries. This option 
preconditions that the potential members 
of the new Union have come to the conclu-
sion that further integration and deepen-
ing seems impossible within the frame-
work of the “old EU.” The creation of a 
new Union would be the ultimate response 
to the fact that the diverging views about 
the future progress of EU integration can 
no longer be reconciled. 
 
The legal basis of the new Union would 
have to be laid down in a separate treaty 
or constitution, which would be worked 
out, approved and ratified solely by the 
states participating in this new entity. 
Here the substance of the original Consti-
tutional Treaty could function as a guide-
line and basis for the negotiations. How-
ever, since the creation of a new Union 
would require a massive political effort on 
the side of the participating states, one 
can expect that the legal basis of this new 
entity would be more ambitious than the 
Constitutional Treaty, which in the final 
analysis was a hard-fought compromise 
between integrationists and intergovern-
mentalists. 
 
The establishment of a new supranational 
Union would entail the creation of an in-
dependent  institutional structure outside 
the framework of the “old EU.” The new 
entity would require a strong and effective 
executive, a parliamentary dimension se-
curing democratic legitimacy, and a sepa-
rate judiciary for settling legal disputes 
within the new Union. A lending of organs 
(Organausleihe) of the “old EU” to the new 
Union does not seem plausible, since EU 
institutions cannot operate on the basis of 
two separate sets of primary law. 
Yet how probable and desirable is the es-
tablishment of such a new supranational 
Union? 
 
•  Current crisis too insignificant: The ex-
tent of the present crisis surrounding the 
ratification of the Constitutional Treaty is 
not big enough to generate the political 
energy needed for the creation of a new 
Union. The EU has by far not reached the 
point at which diverging national Euro-
pean perspectives can only be resolved by 
the establishment of a new Union. In the 
current situation the political, administra-
tive and economic costs would be consid-
erably greater than the potential benefits 
of a new Union. 
 
•  Limited willingness to deepen integra-
tion: The creation of a new Union seems 
politically feasible only if the participating 
states were prepared to transfer compe-
tences and pool sovereignty beyond the 
current level inside the “old EU.” But even 
in the most integration-friendly states 
there is currently hardly any readiness to 
give up or to further pool substantial na-
tional competences. The wider public and 
parts of the elites even in the most inte-
gration-friendly countries are not (yet) 
willing to materialize the idea of a feder-
ally organized “United States of Europe” 
as postulated by Belgian Prime Minister 
Guy Verhofstadt. Moreover, in a newly es-
tablished Union one would also witness a 
clash of diverging interests and diverging 
perspectives concerning the future of the 
integration process. This would in return 
again lead to decisions based on the low-
est common denominator. One cannot as-
sume that the potential members of a new 
Union – which would probably also in-
clude France and the Netherlands in spite 
their “no” to the Constitutional Treaty – 
would be willing or able to agree on a 
common grand vision of Europe. 
 
•  Marginalization of the “old EU” and ri-
valry between the Unions: It seems more 
than likely that the creation of a new su-
pranational Union with an independent set 































































institutional structure would lead to ri-
valry between the “old” and the “new”   
Union. The members of the new Union 
would concentrate their political energies 
on the development of their new-found en-
tity. In return the “old EU” would gradu-
ally become marginalized. In this case the 
“old EU” would not be able to function as a 
kind of bracket between the two entities. 
The idea that the “old EU” could ally the 
more integration-friendly European states 
and those less willing or able to further in-
tegrate in some sort of a “stability com-
munity” would not materialize. On the 
contrary, the rivalry between the two Un-
ions could lead to a division of Europe into 
two opposing camps – on the one hand the 
members of the new Union, and on the 
other the excluded states which seek their 
political fate in other (geo-)political con-
stellations. 
 
•  Counterproductive for further differen-
tiation in Europe: The idea to create a new 
Union in order to resolve the EU reform 
crisis is not only unrealistic and risky. The 
debate about this option is thoroughly 
counterproductive. Repeated demands that 
the constitutional project should proceed, 
if necessary even against the will of cer-
tain EU states, are (mis)perceived as a 
threat to create a closed core Europe. Es-
pecially the EU’s smaller and new coun-
tries fear that they could be left outside   
 
“Rivalry between two  
Unions could lead to a  
division of Europe.” 
such a club. But threats and misunder-
standings overshadow the fact that differ-
entiation provides a key strategic oppor-
tunity in a bigger and more heterogeneous 
EU.  As a result, the real potentials of 
greater differentiation in Europe, which 
allow the implementation of projects with-
out the participation of all EU countries, 
are not exploited. Promising projects re-
main tucked away in a drawer as unrealis-
tic threats to create a core Europe generate 
a climate of mistrust among member 
states. But in order to be able to meet fu-
ture challenges, the EU needs more than 
ever before different speeds if it wants to 
remain effective. Citizens expect the EU to 
provide state-like services in areas as di-
verse as justice and home affairs, security 
and defence policy, taxation, environ-
mental, or social policy. However, not all 
member states can or may wish to provide 
such services at the same time and with 
the same intensity. As was the case in the 
past with regard to the common currency, 
the Schengen accords, or social policy, 
closer cooperation among a smaller group 
of countries can help to overcome a situa-
tion of stalemate and improve the func-
tioning of the EU. In the context of the EU 
reform debate threats calling for a Euro-
pean core however impede greater differ-
entiation in Europe and in the final analy-
sis do a disservice to the future develop-
ment of integration. 
 
 
Reform of the treaty 
amendment procedure 
Since neither the option of a voluntary 
withdrawal nor the establishment of a new 
Union offer a realistic or desirable way out 
of the current reform crisis, the question 
of a feasible alternative arises. Since the 
original Constitutional Treaty, despite its 
numerous advantages, has failed, and as a 
successful reform of European primary law 
presupposes the approval of and ratifica-
t i o n  b y  a l l  E U  m e m b e r  s t a t e s ,  i t  i s  n o w  
time to be realistic. In the forthcoming in-
tergovernmental conference the main task 
will be to salvage as many of the central 
innovations of the original Constitutional 
Treaty as possible within the framework of 
a treaty amending the Treaty of Nice. In 
the negotiations the governments of the 
Czech Republic, France, the Netherlands, 
Poland, and the United Kingdom, for a va-
riety of different reasons, will seek to en-
sure that substantial elements of the Con-
stitutional Treaty are changed or even 































































erenda – which could again impede the 
ratification of the new treaty – and in or-
der to obtain the approval of parliaments 
the final result of the intergovernmental 
conference will have to differ substantially 
from the original Constitutional Treaty. 
 
In the end, numerous and even fundamen-
tal innovations of the Constitutional Treaty 
will be sacrificed for the sake of a com-
promise between the 27 EU governments. 
In addition to the symbols of European 
statehood (the term “constitution,” the 
flag, the anthem) these might include the 
complete integration of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights into the European 
treaty framework, the abolition of a num-
ber of veto rights in the Council, certain 
co-decision rights of the European Parlia-
ment (EP), the double majority procedure 
– at least in its original form –, or the term 
“Union Minister for Foreign Affairs.” 
 
This long and impressive list illustrates 
the fact that the 18 states which had suc-
cessfully ratified the Constitutional Treaty 
will have to pay a high price for their 
readiness to find a compromise – inde-
pendent of what the new treaty will look 
like, and which elements of the Constitu-
tional Treaty it will in the end (no longer) 
contain. As a compensation for the partial 
mutilation of the original treaty, the 
“Friends of the Constitution” including the 
EP and the European Commission should 
ask for two fundamental quid pro quos. 
“Threats calling for a  
European core do a  
disservice to future  
integration.” 
Firstly, at the end of the intergovernmen-
tal conference there should be a binding 
agreement that the constitutionalization of 
Europe will have to continue. The goal of a 
“Constitution II” should be conceptually 
thought of already in the framework of the 
upcoming negotiations, and the grounds 
for the next round of constitutionalization 
should be prepared at an early stage. 
Secondly, the continuation of the constitu-
tional process requires a radical revision 
of the treaty amendment procedure cur-
rently in force (Art. 48 TEU-N). This pro-
cedure, which found its way also into the 
Constitutional Treaty, stipulates that a 
new treaty can only enter into force when 
all EU member states have ratified it. A re-
tention of this procedure means that any 
future substantial revision of European 
primary law may suffer the fate of the 
Constitutional Treaty: A small minority of 
member states or a minuscule part of the 
EU’s total population can delay or perhaps 
even prevent the Union’s political and in-
stitutional development. 
 
In order to break the vicious circle of a 
permanent blockade, the intergovernmen-
tal conference should adopt a procedure, 
which makes one thing unmistakably clear 
to both states and citizens: non-ratification 
cannot inevitably signify the failure of a 
new treaty or constitution but rather calls 
into question a country’s (full) member-
ship in the European Union. Henceforth, 
member states would be under greater 
pressure to ratify a new treaty – a new 
treaty which after all must be adopted and 
signed by every democratically elected EU 
government. Such efforts were not under-
taken by the political elites in France, 
where the Constitutional Treaty was re-
jected by sections of the socialist party, 
nor by the governments in the Czech Re-
public, Poland and the United Kingdom, 
where the “no” votes in France and the 
Netherlands was taken as a welcome ex-
cuse to terminate national ratification 
processes. 
 
There are two basic alternatives how the 
current treaty amendment procedure could 
be revised: (1) A new treaty or constitution 
enters into force if a (super-)qualified ma-
jority of EU states has ratified the new 
primary law, even if not all member states 
have successfully passed the new treaty or 
constitution according to their national 
ratification requirements. If ratification 
fails in a first attempt, each member state 































































tional ratification within a predetermined 
period of time. (2) The new primary law is 
ratified on the basis of a Europe-wide ref-
erendum. If a qualified majority of EU citi-
zens within a qualified majority of mem-
ber states is in favour of ratifying the 
treaty or constitution, the new primary law 
can enter into force. 
 
It must be clear for both alternatives that 
no substantial revision of primary law can 
enter into force against the will of an EU 
state. Thus each country should be ac-
corded the right to leave the Union on the 
grounds of the voluntary withdrawal 
clause. If the state in question does not 
make use of this possibility, remaining in 
the EU will be tantamount to accepting the 
new primary law. 
 
If the “Friends of the Constitution” man-
age to push through a fundamental revi-
sion of the treaty amendment procedure as 
a quid pro quo for their readiness to com-
promise in the forthcoming intergovern-
mental negotiations, the constitutional cri-
sis of the past two years may well have 
served an important purpose. The contents 
and structure of the new primary law may 
well fall qualitatively behind the original 
Constitutional Treaty. However, the consti-
tutionalization of Europe, which is essen-
tial to ensure the old continent’s ability to 
shape developments in a changing global 
environment, could continue without run-
ning the danger of a déjà-vu ending in yet 
another constitutional crisis in the course 
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